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Trustless Attestation Service for TEEs with Zero-Knowledge Proofs

June 6, 4:25 PM - 4:45 PM
Grand Ballroom Salon B

In the remote attestation procedures of confidential computing, the verifier (often called attestation service) plays a critical role in the attestation mechanism to verify the evidence and produce attestation results. However, in the current implementation, attestation services are designed and implemented as trusted components in the remote attestation architecture. That is to say, the relying party who usually owns the secrets has to trust these attestation services provided by cloud service providers, which breaks the promise of TEE on excluding cloud service providers from the trust boundary. Thus, a critical question emerges: can we exclude attestation services from the trust boundary? In this session, we will present a possible solution to implementing a trustless attestation service for TEEs. By leveraging recent developments in zero-knowledge proofs, the proposed attestation service can be deployed in an untrusted environment that is out of the trust boundary while providing provable attestation results.

About the speakers

Mingshen Sun

Research Scientist, TikTok

Mingshen Sun is a Research Scientist at TikTok, leading applications and innovations of trusted and confidential computing technologies. He also serves on PPMC of the Apache Teaclave (incubating) project.

Donghang Lu

Research Scientist, TikTok Inc.

Donghang Lu is a Research Scientist in Privacy Innovation Lab at TikTok. His work focuses on the design and optimization of secure multiparty computation protocols and applications.